part 2 . 8. Topic and Focus

part 2 . 8. Topic and Focus, Materiały naukowe, The Hanbook of Pragmatics

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8. Topic and Focus
JEANETTE
JEANETTE K. GUNDEL
K. GUNDEL
K. GUNDEL
AND
AND
THORSTEIN FRETHEIM
THORSTEIN FRETHEIM
AND
Subject
Theoretical Linguistics
Ç
Pragmatics
DOI:
10.1111/b.9780631225485.2005.00010.x
In his Grammar of Spoken Chinese, Chao (1968) notes a distinction between the grammatical
predicate of a sentence and what he calls the Ñlogical predicate.Ò Chao points out that the two do not
always coincide, illustrating this point with the following exchange between a guide (A) and a tourist
(B):
(1). A: We are now passing the oldest winery in the region.
B: Why?
The source of the humor here is that the English sentence uttered by the guide has two possible
interpretations. On one interpretation, the main predicate asserted by the sentence (Chao's logical
predicate) coincides with the grammatical predicate, i.e., are now passing the oldest winery in the
region. On the other interpretation, the logical predicate includes only the direct object. The tourist
(B) seems to be questioning the first interpretation (we are passing the oldest winery in the region),
but it is the second interpretation that the guide actually intended to convey (what we are passing is
the oldest winery in the region).
Chao notes (1968: 78) that the humor would be absent in Chinese because Ñin general, if in a
sentence of the form S-V-O the object O is the logical predicate, it is often recast in the form S-V de
shO Ówhat S V's is O', thus putting O in the center of the predicate.Ò In this case, the guide's intended
message would be expressed in Chinese by a sentence which more literally translates as The one we
are passing now is the oldest winery in the region.
Within the Western grammatical tradition, the idea that there is a distinction between the grammatical
subject and predicate of a sentence and the subject-predicate structure of the meaning that may be
conveyed by this sentence (its
INFORMATION
STRUCTURE
) can be traced back at least to the second half of
the nineteenth century, when the German linguists von der Gabelentz (1868) and Paul (1880) used the
terms
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SUBJECT
and
PREDICATE
for what Chao calls Ñlogical subjectÒ and ÑpredicateÒ (or
ÑtopicÒ and ÑcommentÒ), respectively. Work of the Czech linguist Mathesius in the 1920s (e.g.
Mathesius 1928) initiated a rich and highly influential tradition of research in this area within the
Prague School that continues to the present day (see Firbas 1966, Daneÿ 1974, Sgall et al. 1973, Sgall
et al. 1986, inter alia). Also influential has been the seminal work of Halliday (1967) and, within the
generative tradition, Kuroda (1965, 1972), Chomsky (1971), Jackendoff (1972), Kuno (1972, 1976b),
Gundel (1974), and Reinhart (1981), inter alia. More recent work will be cited below.
Unless otherwise noted, we use the term
FOCUS
in this paper to refer roughly to the function described
by Chao's notion of logical predicate, and we use the term
TOPIC
to refer to the complement of focus.
Topic is what the sentence is about; focus is what is predicated about the topic. Our primary goals will
be to clarify some of the major conceptual and terminological issues, to provide an overview of the
phenomena that correlate with topic and focus across languages, and to review recent empirical and
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theoretical developments.
1 Conceptual and Terminological Issues
The literature on topic and focus is characterized by an absence of uniformity in terminology. Besides
the earlier terms of psychological/logical subject and predicate, current terms for topic also include
THEME
and
GROUND
. In addition to focus, other terms for the complement of topic include
COMMENT
and
RHEME
. Most authors agree that these concepts, unlike purely syntactic functions such as subject and
object, have a consistent semantic/pragmatic value. However, topic and focus are also sometimes
defined directly on syntactic structures (e.g., Chomsky 1965, Halliday 1967, Kiss 1998).
Consequently, topic, focus, and related terms have been used in a dual sense (sometimes by the same
author) to refer to syntactic (and phonological) categories as well as their semantic/pragmatic
interpretation. Below we address a few of the major conceptual issues.
1.1 Two given
-new distinctions
new distinctions
The topic-focus distinction has been widely associated with the division between given and new
information in a sentence. There has been disagreement and confusion, however, regarding the exact
nature of this association. Some of the confusion has resulted from conflating two types of
givenness-newness.
1
Following Gundel (1988, 1999a), we refer to these as
REFERENTIAL
GIVENNESS
-
NEWNESS
and
RELATIONAL
GIVENNESS
-
NEWNESS
.
Referential givenness-newness involves a relation between a linguistic expression and a
corresponding non-linguistic entity in the speaker/hearer's mind, the discourse (model), or some real
or possible world, depending on where the referents or corresponding meanings of these linguistic
expressions are assumed to reside. Some representative examples of referential givenness concepts
include existential presupposition (e.g. Strawson 1964b), various senses of referentiality and
specificity (e.g. Fodor and Sag 1982, En 1991), the familiarity condition on definite descriptions (e.g.
Heim 1982), the activation and identifiability statuses of Chafe (1994) and Lambrecht (1994), the
hearer-old/new and discourse-old/new statuses of Prince (1992), and the cognitive statuses of
Gundel et al. (1993). For example, the cognitive statuses on the Givenness Hierarchy in (2) represent
referential givenness statuses that an entity mentioned in a sentence may have in the mind of the
addressee.
Relational givenness-newness, in contrast, involves a partition of the semantic/conceptual
representation of a sentence into two complementary parts, X and Y, where X is what the sentence is
about (the logical/psychological subject) and Y is what is predicated about X (the
logical/psychological predicate). X is given in relation to Y in the sense that it is independent of, and
outside the scope of, what is predicated in Y. Y is new in relation to X in the sense that it is new
information that is asserted, questioned, etc. about X. Relational givenness-newness thus reflects how
the informational content of a particular event or state of affairs expressed by a sentence is
represented and how its truth value is to be assessed. Examples of relational givenness-newness
pairs include the notions of logical/psychological subject and predicate mentioned above,
presupposition-focus (e.g. Chomsky 1971, Jackendoff 1972), topic-comment (e.g. Gundel 1974),
theme-rheme (e.g., Vallduv 1992), and topic-predicate (Erteschik-Shir 1997). Topic and focus, as we
use these terms here, are thus relationally given and new, respectively.
Referential givenness-newness and relational givenness-newness are logically independent, as seen
in the following examples (from Gundel 1980 and 1985, respectively):
(3). A: Who called?
B: Pat said
SHE
2
called.
(4). A: Did you order the chicken or the pork?
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B: It was the
PORK
that I ordered.
If
SHE
in (3) is used to refer to Pat, it is referentially given in virtually every possible sense. The
intended referent is presupposed, specific, referential, familiar, activated, in focus, identifiable,
hearer-old, and discourse-old. But, at the same time, the subject of the embedded sentence in this
example is relationally new and, therefore, receives a focal accent. It instantiates the variable in the
relationally given, topical part of the sentence, x called, thus yielding the new information expressed
in (3). Similarly, in (4), the pork is referentially given. Its cognitive status would be at least activated,
possibly even in focus, since it was mentioned in the immediately preceding sentence.
3
But it is new
in relation to the topic of (4), what B ordered.
The two kinds of givenness-newness also differ in other respects. Both are properties of meaning
representations. However, while relational givenness-newness is necessarily a property of linguistic
representations, i.e., the meanings associated with sentences, referential givenness-newness is not
specifically linguistic at all. Thus, one can just as easily characterize a visual or non-linguistic auditory
stimulus, for example a house or a tune, as familiar or not, in focus or not, and even specific or not.
In contrast, the topic-focus partition can only apply to linguistic expressions, specifically sentences or
utterances and their interpretations.
Corresponding to this essential difference is the fact that referential givenness statuses, e.g., familiar
or in focus, are uniquely determined by the knowledge and attention state of the addressee at a given
point in the discourse. The speaker has no choice in the matter.
4
Relational givenness notions like
topic, on the other hand, may be constrained or influenced by the discourse context (as all aspects of
meaning are in some sense), but they are not uniquely determined by it. As Sgall et al. (1973: 12)
notes, a sentence like Yesterday was the last day of the Davis Cup match between Australia and
Romania could be followed either by Australia won the match or by The match was won by Australia.
While the latter two sentences could each have an interpretation in which the topic is the Davis Cup
match, or one in which the whole sentence is a comment on some topic not overtly represented in the
sentence, it is also possible in exactly the same discourse context to interpret the first of these
sentences as a comment about Australia and the second as a comment about the match. Which of
these possible interpretations is the intended one depends on the interests and perspective of the
speaker.
One place in which the linguistic context often seems to determine a single topic-focus structure is in
question-answer pairs, which is why these provide one of the more reliable contextual tests for
relational givenness-newness concepts. Thus, (5b) is judged to be an appropriate answer to the
question in (5a) because the location of the prominent pitch accent is consistent with an
interpretation in which the topic is who the Red Sox played and the focus is the Yankees. But (5c), for
which the location of prominent pitch accent requires an interpretation in which the topic is who
played the Yankees, is not an appropriate response to (5a).
(5)a. Who did the Red Sox play?
(b). The Red Sox played the
YANKEES
.
(c). #The
RED
SOX
played the Yankees.
(d). #I love baseball.
The fact that the judgments here are sensitive to linguistic context has no doubt contributed to the
widely held view that topic and focus are pragmatic concepts. However, as Gundel (1999b) points out,
questions constrain other aspects of the semantic-conceptual content of an appropriate answer as
well. All aspects of the meaning of a sentence have pragmatic effects in the sense that they contribute
to a relevant context for interpretation. This much is determined by general principles that govern
language production and understanding (Sperber and Wilson 1986a). Thus, (5d) is no more
appropriate as an answer to (5a) than (5c) would be, though the exact reason for the
inappropriateness is different. The fact that location of the prominent pitch accent has pragmatic
effects thus does not itself warrant the conclusion that pitch accent codes a pragmatic concept, any
more so than it would follow that the difference in meaning between (5b) and (5d) is pragmatic
because the two sentences would be appropriate in different linguistic contexts.
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1.2
1.2 Referential properties of topic
1.2
Referential properties of topic
We noted in the previous section that topic-focus structure is associated with relational givenness-
newness in the sense that topic is given in relation to focus and focus represents the new information
predicated about the topic. This association is logically independent of referential givenness-
newness, which is not necessarily connected to topic or focus at all. As we saw in examples (3) and
(4), the focus (relationally new) part of the sentence can contain material that has a high degree of
referential givenness. There is, however, a good deal of empirical evidence for an independent
connection between topic and some degree of referential givenness. Virtually the whole range of
possible referential givenness conditions on topics has been suggested, including presupposition,
familiarity, specificity, referentiality, and focus of attention.
Some of the more well-known facts that indicate a connection between topicality and some kind of
referential givenness have to do with the ÑdefinitenessÒ or ÑpresuppositionÒ effect of topics. For
example, it has often been noted (e.g., in Kuroda 1965, Kuno 1972, inter alia) that the phrase marked
by a topic marker in Japanese and Korean necessarily has a ÑdefiniteÒ (including generic)
interpretation. Thus, in (6), where the subject phrase is followed by the nominative marker ga, both
the subject and the object can have either a definite or indefinite interpretation. But in (7), where the
subject is followed by the topic marker wa, it can only be interpreted as definite.
(6). Neko ga kingyo o ijit-te ÈÈ cat
NOM
goldfish
OBJ
play with-and
ÑThe/A cat is playing with the/a goldfish, and È Ñ
(7). Neko wa kingyo o ijit-te cat
TOP
goldfish
OBJ
play with-and
ÑThe/*A cat is playing with the/a goldfish, and È Ñ
Similarly, in prototypical topic-comment constructions like those in (8)-(11), the topic phrase
adjoined to the left of the clause is definite:
(8). My sister, she's a high school teacher.
(9). That book you borrowed, are you finished reading it yet?
(10). My work, I'm going crazy. (Bland 1980)
(11). The Red Sox, did they play the Yankees?
Indefinites are generally excluded from topic position unless they can be interpreted generically, as
illustrated in (12) (from Gundel 1988):
(12)a. The window, it's still open.
(b). *A window, it's still open.
5
Gundel (1985, 1988) proposes a condition on felicitous topics which states that their referents must
already be familiar, in the sense that the addressee must have an existing representation in memory.
6
Since indefinites aren't generally used to refer to familiar entities (unless they are intended to be
interpreted generically), the familiarity condition on topics provides a principled explanation for facts
like those in (6)-(12).
7
It also captures, in more overtly cognitive terms, Strawson's (1964b) insight
that only topical definites necessarily carry an existential presupposition.
The examples in (6)-(12) provide support for a familiarity condition on topics only to the extent that
the constructions in question can be assumed to mark topics. These assumptions, though widely
held, are not totally uncontroversial. For example, Tomlin (1995) proposes that Japanese wa is not a
topic marker, but a new information marker. He argues that topics are associated with given
information, but wa is typically used to mark noun phrases referring to entities that are newly
introduced or reintroduced into the discourse. Tomlin's argument rests on the assumption that topics
are referentially given in the sense of being the current focus of attention. Similar restrictions on
topics are assumed by Erteschik-Shir (1997), who analyzes the left-dislocated phrase in constructions
like (8)-(12) as a focus rather than a topic, since it is more likely to be something the speaker wants
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to call to the addressee's attention than something that is already in the focus of attention. Both
Tomlin and Erteschik-Shir base their arguments on conceptions of topic that blur the distinction
between relational and referential givenness by essentially equating topic with focus of attention.
8
Their notion of topic is thus closer to Ñcontinued topicÒ or to the backward-looking center of
Centering Theory (see Walker et al. 1998). While some authors propose that topics are necessarily
activated or even in focus because they have been mentioned recently in the discourse, others deny
that topics must have any degree of referential givenness at all, including familiarity. For example,
Reinhart (1981) proposes that topics only have to be referential. She notes that specific indefinites,
whose referents are generally not familiar, can appear in dislocated topic position, as in the following
example from Prince (1985):
9
(13). An old preacher down there, they augured under the grave where his wife was buried.
To sum up, topics are relationally given, by definition, in the sense that they are what the
sentence/utterance is about. They provide the context for the main predication, which is assessed
relative to the topic. The association of topics with definiteness across languages suggests that topics
must also be referentially given (familiar or at least uniquely identifiable), and some researchers
define topics even more narrowly to include only entities with the highest degree of referential
givenness, the current center of attention. Others propose to abandon any referential givenness
condition on topics, citing the possibility of indefinite topics as in (13).
1.3
1.3 Information focus vs. contrastive focus
Information focus vs. contrastive focus
As we saw in the previous section, topic is sometimes defined in terms of the referential givenness
status of entities, thus resulting in some conceptual confusion between two distinct, though
orthogonal, interpretive categories: topic as a relational category (the complement of focus/comment)
and topic as the current center of attention. There has been a similar confusion between two
conceptually distinct interpretative notions of focus: one of these is relational - the information
predicated about the topic; the other is referential - material that the speaker calls to the addressee's
attention, thereby often evoking a contrast with other entities that might fill the same position. We
refer to these two senses as
INFORMATION
FOCUS
and
CONTRASTIVE
FOCUS
, respectively.
10
According to
Rooth (1985), evoking alternatives is the primary function of focus (cf. Chafe 1976 for a similar
position), and the contrast set evoked by the focus provides the locus for focus-sensitive operators
such as only, even, and also. Other researchers (e.g. Horn 1981, Vallduv 1992) take information
status to be primary and treat contrast as secondary and derivative.
Both information focus and contrastive focus are coded by some type of linguistic prominence across
languages, a fact that no doubt has contributed to a blurring of the distinction between these two
categories. Information focus is given linguistic prominence, typically (and possibly universally) by
means of some sort of prosodic highlighting, because it is the main predication expressed in the
sentence - the new information in relation to the topic. It correlates with the questioned position in
the relevant (implicit or explicit) wh-question or alternative yes-no question that the sentence would
be responsive to. Thus, in both (14) and (15) below Bill expresses the information focus that identifies
the one who called the meeting (the topic) as Bill.
(14). A: Do you know who called the meeting?
B1:
BILL
called the meeting.
B2: It was
BILL
who called the meeting.
(15). Every time we get together I'm the one who has to organize things, but this time
BILL
called the meeting.
But marking the information focus is not the only reason to call attention to a constituent. A
constituent may also be made prominent because the speaker/writer does not think the addressee's
attention is focused on some entity and for one reason or another would like it to be - for example,
because a new topic is being introduced or reintroduced (topic shift) or because the meaning
associated with some constituent is being contrasted, implicitly or explicitly, with something else.
11
The example in (16) illustrates a contrastive focus on the constituent referring to the topic (that coat).
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