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22. Pragmatics and the Lexicon
REINHARD BLUTNER
Theoretical Linguistics
Ç
Pragmatics
Subject
DOI:
10.1111/b.9780631225485.2005.00024.x
1 Introduction
Introduction
In the view of Katz and Fodor (1963: 176) the scope of a language description covers the knowledge of
a fluent speaker Ñabout the structure of his language that enables him to use and understand its
sentences.Ò The scope of a semantic theory is then the part of such a description not covered by a
theory of syntax. There is a second aspect which Katz and Fodor make use of in order to bound the
scope of semantics. This is the pragmatic aspect of language and it excludes from the description any
ability to use and understand sentences that depends on the ÑsettingÒ of the sentence. Setting,
according to Katz and Fodor (1963), can refer to previous discourse, sociophysical factors and any
other use of Ñnon-linguisticÒ knowledge. A nice demonstration of the essence of Ñnon-linguisticÒ
knowledge in the understanding of sentences was provided by psychologists in the 1970s (e.g. Kintsch
1974). Let's consider the following utterance:
(1) The tones sounded impure because the hem was torn.
I suggest we do not really understand what this sentence means until we know that this sentence is
about a bagpipe. It is evident that this difficulty is not due to our insufficient knowledge of English.
The syntax involved is quite simple and there are no unknown words in the sentence. Instead, the
difficulty is related to troubles in accessing the relevant conceptual setting. The idea of bagpiping is
simply too unexpected to be derived in a quasi-neutral utterance context. The example demonstrates
that we have to distinguish carefully between the linguistic aspects of representing the (formal)
meaning of sentences and the pragmatic aspects of utterance interpretation (speaker's meaning).
In this contribution I restrict myself to the semantics of lexical units and intend to explain the
interaction of lexical meaning with pragmatics. Katz and Fodor (1963) already have stressed the point
that a full account of lexical meaning has to include more information than that which allows one to
discriminate the meanings of different words. In one of their examples they argue that Ñtake backÒ is
used in very different ways in the sentences (2a, b), although the relevant lexical entries are
semantically unambiguous.
(2) a. Should we take the lion back to the zoo?
b. Should we take the bus back to the zoo?
An obvious difference between these sentences is that the lion is the object taken back to the zoo in
(2a), but the bus is the instrument that takes us back to the zoo in (2b). The problem for the pragmatic
component of utterance interpretation is to explain the difference in terms of different conceptual
settings, starting from a lexicon that doesn't discriminate the two occurrences of take back
semantically and from a syntax that is completely parallel for the two sentences.
1
As another introductory example let's consider the perception verbs of English (cf. Sweetser 1990). If
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Saussure is right, there is an essential arbitrary component in the association of words or morphemes
with what they mean. Consequently, the feature of arbitrariness could be taken at least as a sufficient
condition for the presence of semantic information. It is certainly an arbitrary fact of English that see
(rather than, say, buy or smell) refers to visual perception when it is part of the utterance (3a). Given
this arbitrary association between a phonological word and its meaning, however, it is by no means
arbitrary that see can also have an epistemic reading as in (3b).
(3) a. I see the tree.
b. I see what you're getting at.
Moreover, it is not random that other sensory verbs such as smell or taste are not used to express an
epistemic reading. Sweetser (1990) tries to give an explanation for such facts and insists that they have
to do with conceptual organization. It is our knowledge about the inner world that implicates that
vision and knowledge are highly related, in contrast to, say, smelling and knowledge or taste and
knowledge, which are only weakly related for normal human beings. If this claim is correct, then the
information that see may have an epistemic reading but smell and taste do not must no longer be
stipulated semantically. Obviously, this can be formalized by language-independent, universal
preferences. In specific languages, these preferences can be overridden - consider the ÑingestiveÒ
verbs in languages of India, or even English ÑI can't swallow thatÒ = Ñcan't believeÒ. Instead, this
information is pragmatic in nature, having to do with the utterance of words within a conceptual
setting, and can be derived by means of some general mechanism of conceptual interpretation.
Considerations of this kind raise a standard puzzle for lexical semantics when we ask how to separate
the (mental) lexicon from the (mental) encyclopedia. How should we separate information about the
meaning of words from information about the (supposed) reality associated with these words?
Admittedly, it may be rather difficult to distinguish these two kinds of information. Tangible, theory-
independent empirical tests simply don't exist. There are two principal possibilities for dealing with
this situation. First, the distinction between the lexicon and the encyclopedia is said to be illusory (as
has sometimes been suggested by proponents of Cognitive Semantics, e.g. G. Lakoff 1987). In this
case all the relevant information has to be put into the lexicon. It will be argued in what follows that
this view leads to a highly non-compositional account of meaning projection. The second possibility is
to take the distinction as an important one. As a consequence, we are concerned with two different
types of mechanisms:
¤ a mechanism that deals with the combinatorial aspects of meaning;
¤ a pragmatic mechanism that deals with conceptual interpretation.
Once we have adopted such theoretical mechanisms, the problem of discriminating lexical semantic
information from encyclopedic information need no longer look so hopeless, and we really may profit
from a division of labor between semantics and pragmatics. It is the position of this contribution to
argue in favor of the second option.
From a Gricean perspective, two different ideas of how to overcome the divergences between (formal)
meaning and natural language interpretation come to mind. The first one uses conventional
implicatures as an enlargement of the classical information entries. The second idea uses
conversational implicatures as a method to overcome the divergences. While I believe that modern
semantic theories (which usually are characterized as dynamic, epistemic, and non-monotonic) make
the conception of conventional implicature superfluous as an addendum to the semantic component, I
do not think the same is true of conversational implicature. In fact, in this chapter I will argue that the
proper use of conversational implicature will resolve some of the problems of lexical interpretation that
remain unsolved otherwise.
The conceptual core of the theory I want to propose demands a straight formulation of conversational
implicature. Paired with the idea of (radical) semantic underspecification in the lexicon and an
appropriate representation of contextual and encyclopedic knowledge, this conception avoids
unmotivated lexical ambiguities as well as the need for expansive reinterpretation and coercion
mechanisms.
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There are two basic aims of this chapter. First, I want to demonstrate some general problems we are
confronted with when trying to analyze the utterance of words within concrete conceptual and
contextual settings and to go beyond the aspects of meaning typically investigated by a contrastive
analysis of lexemes within the Katz-Fodor tradition of semantics. This may help to develop a sensitive
feeling for what kind of problems may be approached by means of the division of labor between lexical
semantics and pragmatics. Second, I would like to argue in favor of a particular account of the
interaction between lexical semantics and pragmatics, one that combines the idea of (radical) semantic
underspecification in the lexicon with a theory of pragmatic strengthening (based on conversational
implicature). It is illustrated that this view conforms with recent attempts to extend the framework of
optimality theory (originally proposed by Prince and Smolensky 1993) for the purpose of natural
language interpretation.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In the next section I will emphasize some important
consequences of the traditional view of (lexical) semantics. In the third section some phenomena are
collected that have a prima facie claim on the attention of linguists, and I will show that most of these
phenomena conflict with the theoretical assumptions made by the traditional view. In the fourth
section I introduce a particular way of combining (radical) semantic underspecification with a theory of
pragmatic strengthening. Finally, the fifth section shows that this view can be expressed very naturally
by using a (bidirectional) optimality theory of interpretation.
2 The Standard View of (Lexical) Semantics
In this section I will remain neutral about what sort of thing a semantic value should be taken to be: an
expression in some language of thought, a mental structure as applied in cognitive semantics or a
model-theoretic construct. To be sure, there are important differences between conceptualistic
accounts la Katz and Fodor and realistic accounts as developed within model-theoretic semantics.
These differences become visible, first of all, when it comes to substantiate the relationship between
individual and social meaning (see Grdenfors 1993). For the purpose of the present paper, however,
the question of whether semantics is realistic or conceptualistic doesn't matter. In the following I will
concentrate on some general features that can be ascribed to both accounts in their classical design.
These features are not intended to completely characterize the family of theories representing the
Ñstandard viewÒ in any sense. Rather, their selection is intended to emphasize several properties that
may become problematic when a broader view of utterance meaning is taken. In sections 4 and 5, I will
use these features for marking out the borderline between semantics and pragmatics.
2.1 Systematicity and compositionality
One nearly uncontroversial feature of our linguistic system is the systematicity of linguistic
competence. According to Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988: 41Ï2), this feature refers to the fact that the
ability to understand and produce some expressions is intrinsically connected to the speaker's ability
to produce and understand other semantically related expressions. The classical solution to account
for the systematicity of linguistic competence crucially makes use of the principle of compositionality.
In its general form, tracing back at least to Frege (1892), this principle states the following:
(4) The meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its parts and their
syntactic mode of combination.
In an approximation that is sufficient for present purposes, the principle of compositionality states that
Ña lexical item must make approximately the same semantic contribution to each expression in which it
occursÒ (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988: 38). As a simple example consider adjective-noun combinations
such as brown cow and black horse. Let's take absolute adjectives (such as brown and black) as one-
place predicates. Moreover, non-relational nouns are considered as one-place predicates as well. Let's
assume further that the combinatorial semantic operation that corresponds to adjectival modification
is the intersection operation. Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) conclude that these assumptions may explain
the feature of systematicity in the case of adjectival modification. For example, when a person is able
to understand the expressions brown cow and black horse, then she should understand the
expressions brown horse and black cow as well. Note that it is the use of the intersection operation
that is involved in explaining the phenomenon, not compositionality per se. Nevertheless the principle
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of compositionality is an important guide that helps us to find specific solutions to the puzzle of
systematicity.
Lexical semantics is concerned with the meanings of the smallest parts of linguistic expressions that
are assumed to bear meaning. Assumptions about the meanings of lexical units are justified
empirically only insofar as they make correct predictions about the meanings of larger constituents.
Consequently, though the principle of compositionality clearly goes beyond the scope of lexical
semantics, it is indispensable as a methodological instrument for lexical semantics. I state the principle
of compositionality as the first feature characterizing the standard view of (lexical) semantics.
2.2 The
2.2 The monotonicity of inferential competence
monotonicity of inferential competence
The
SYSTEMATICITY
OF
INFERENCE
is another important feature of the standard view that was emphasized
by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988). Having in mind the logical vocabulary of natural language, the authors
stress the common claim that these elements trigger systematic inferential competences. To be
accurate, the systematicity feature of inference refers to the structure-sensitivity of the inferential
relation. This contrasts with ASSOCIATIONS, which are not seen as structure-sensitive. As a standard
example take the rule of S
IMPLIFICATION
in natural deduction, which is one of two rules connected with
logical conjunction:
(5) P and Q
Ԉ P
In a conditional proof, the constituent structure of the rule proves essential. In example (5) the
constituent symbols P and Q function as place holders or variables, without having any intrinsic
content. This trait allows different instantiations in one and the same actual proof. For instance, when
starting with the premise p&q&r, we can infer p, q, and r, inter alia, by applying the same rule (5)
different times.
Why does the content
content of the premises not affect the inferences drawn? I claim that the answer to this
question has to do with the more general idea of the
MONOTONICITY
OF
INFERENTIAL
COMPETENCE
. Tarski
(1930, 1935) was the first to state the idea of monotonicity as one of three conditions that aimed to
reflect the minimal requirements which a deductive inferential relation must fulfill if it is truly to be a
logical relation. In informal terms, the condition says that old theorems remain valid when the system
of axioms (definitions, meaning postulates, factual knowledge) has been augmented by adding some
new axioms.
2
For the sake of illustration, assume that the ÑcontentÒ of the elementary expressions p, q, and r is
partially described by some additional premises ?. If we add ? to the original expression p&q&r, then
we expect that the ÑoldÒ inferences p, q, and r remain valid - due to the monotonicity of our inferential
competence. Otherwise, we could not be sure that the old inferences survive, and the content of the
constituent expressions p, q, r would affect the inferential potential of the logical conjunction - a
rather absurd idea. Hence, the idea that logical inferences respect this pattern of monotonicity is so
natural that it may appear to be unavoidable.
content
We conclude that the systematicity of inferential competence is intrinsically connected with the
monotonicity restriction of the inferential relation. Without this restriction the systematicity of
inference can become lost for the most part. However, what is good for mathematics must not
necessarily conform to the laws of cognition in the general case. The monotonicity restriction is an
empirical issue concerning our inferential competence. As such it has to be carefully checked.
2.3 The monotonicity of
2.3 The monotonicity of the lexical system
the lexical system
Another general characteristic of the standard view is connected with the idea of analyzing the
meanings of lexical items as a complex of more primitive elements. The main motivation for such a
COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS is connected with the explanation of such semantic relations as antonymy,
synonymy, and semantic entailment. If the meaning of a lexical item were not analyzable into
components, the lexical system of grammar would have to simply enumerate the actually realized
relations as independent facts. This procedure would be descriptively uneconomical. More important, it
would miss the point that these facts are NOT independent from each other. The componential
approach can be found both in theories of meaning in generative semantics (cf. Fodor 1977) and in
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model-theoretic based (especially Montagovian) semantic work (cf. Dowty 1979).
Figure 22.1 Monotonic and non
-monotonic extensions of a
monotonic extensions of a (lexicalized) system of concepts
monotonic extensions of a
(lexicalized) system of concepts
Defining the meaning of lexical items in terms of a repertoire of more primitive elements leads to a
second-order property which I will call the MONOTONICITY OF THE LEXICAL SYSTEM. In short, this
monotonicity restriction refers to the fact that we can incrementally extend the lexical system (by
adding some definitions for new lexical material) without influencing the content of elements already
defined.
At first glance, the monotonicity of the lexical system looks quite natural as a constraint within formal
semantics. Of course, it would be very surprising if the content of È is a bachelor were to change if the
system learns what a spinster is (by acquiring the corresponding definition). Similarly, the meaning of
prime, even, odd (number) should be independent of whether the system knows the meaning of
rational number or perfect number.
3
It should be stressed that it is not the idea of decomposition (definition) per se that leads to the
monotonicity feature of the lexical system. Instead, it is its classical treatment within a formal
metalanguage that exhibits all features of a deductive system in the sense of Tarski. In this vein, the
monotonicity of the lexical system can be seen as a specific realization of the more general aspect of
the monotonicity of our inferential competence.
Figure 22.1
illustrates the difference between monotonic lexical systems and non-monotonic ones in a
schematic way. The picture simplifies matters by identifying meanings with extensions (represented by
Venn diagrams). In the case of a monotonic system, the addition of a new predicate R doesn't change
the extensions of the old predicates P and Q. However, the same doesn't hold in the case of a non-
monotonic system. In this case we have field-effects: there seem to be attracting and repelling forces
that shift the extensions of old predicates in a particular way when new lexical material comes into
play.
2.4 The persistence of anomaly
Lexical semantics has to account for semantic contradictions such as *married spinster, *female
bachelor, *reddish green and for other types of semantic anomalies as exemplified by the famous
*Colorless green ideas sleep furiously. Usually, SEMANTIC ANOMALY of an expression is defined as
logical incompatibility of (some part of) the formal translation of the expression taken in union with a
given system ˙ of definitions and/or meaning postulates (e.g. McCawley 1971). Explicating
incompatibility in terms of inconsistency and inconsistency in terms of contradictory entailments
makes it possible to derive a second-order property which I call the PERSISTENCE OF ANOMALY.
The persistence of anomaly comes in two variants:
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